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Rapid growth of the consumer credit industry,' combined
with widespread public ignorance about credit practices and
costs, set the stage for historic legislative action regulating consu-
mer credit. In 1968, after several years of congressional study,
the Truth in Lending Act was adopted.'
In hearings conducted by both houses of Congress it was
clearly demonstrated that because information either was not
available to consumers or was deceptively or technically phrased,
the consumer was unable to shop for the best credit terms in the
same way he could shop for best buys when making cash pur-
chases.' Because creditors used different systems of credit com-
putation and billing, the consumer often found he was unable to
make an intelligent choice and instead relied on such slogans as
"easy payment," "low monthly charge" or "take thirty-six months
to pay" when choosing credit. These "easy payments" often
translated into annual percentage rates roughly twice the "add-
on" or "discount" rate shown on the customer's contract, some-
times leaving the customer with a liability he could not meet.4
* B.A., Dickinson College, 1962; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1965;
Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars; Advisor, Legal Divi-
sion, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The author formerly
had responsibility for the Board's Truth in Lending function. The views ex-
pressed are adapted from testimony given before the Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs of the House Banking and Currency Committee on July 26, 1973. To
the extent they vary from that testimony they represent the author's own views
and not necessarily those of the Board or its staff.
1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967) which
shows that from the end of World War II through 1967 the amount of credit
had increased from $5.6 billion to almost $96 billion.
2. The Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970). The Act became effective on July 1, 1969.
3. See Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4. See notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text infra.
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Correction of this national problem of uninformed use of credit
was the -purpose of the Truth in Lending Act.5
The scope of the Act may accurately be described as im-
mense. Outstanding consumer credit now exceeds 160 billion
dollars, and more than sixteen per cent of the American consu-
mer's disposable income goes to the payment of installment
credit.6 Although certain transactions are exempted from the
provisions of the Act, it applies to virtually all extensions of credit
for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes.7 Thus,
every home mortgage, credit card transaction, retail installment
contract and personal loan is subject to the protections of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z which implements and in-
terprets it.8  The extent of the Act is reflected in its enforcement
apparatus. Nine different federal agencies join together in en-
forcing the requirements of Truth in Lending.
Though neither the Act nor Regulation Z is designed to
tell creditors the terms under which they may extend credit,
Truth in Lending does demand that consumers be informed about
the terms of their credit transactions. This is accomplished by
requiring the use of standard terminology, uniform methods of
calculating the cost of the credit and making this information
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) which provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and
the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by
the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from
an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of
this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
6. 59 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 54 (Dec. 1973).
7. Truth in Lending exempts from coverage the extension of credit for busi-
ness or commercial purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970). In determining
whether a transaction is exempt, the purpose of the transaction, not the property
on which the security interest is retained, controls. See Sapenter v. Dreyco, Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 450 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 920 (1972). Also exempt under the above section are transactions in
securities with a registered broker-dealer and transactions other than real prop-
erty in which the amount financed exceeds $25,000.
8. Congress has stipulated that the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System is given authority to promulgate regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(1970). These regulations are codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-13 (1973). The
regulations are known collectively as Regulation Z.
9. The federal agencies include the Civil Aeronautics Board, Comptroller
of the Currency, Federal Credit Union Administration, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, National Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Reserve Board,
Federal Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Packers and
Stockyards Administration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970). Five states (Connec-
ticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Oklahoma and Wyoming) have received exemptions
from the Act because of enactment of similar state laws. For the procedures
to be followed in obtaining a state exemption see IQ C.F.R. § 226.12 (1973)
and the Supplements to Regulation Z referred to therein.
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available to the consumer.' 0 The goal expressed by Congress
is a public sufficiently informed to make intelligent choices when
financing purchases or obtaining loans."
Courts have consistently interpreted the Truth in Lending
Act and regulations issued pursuant to it broadly in order to best
effectuate the remedial intent of Congress. 12  In addition to an
examination of judicial approval of Truth in Lending, this arti-
cle will discuss the implementation of the Act and will focus on
significant developments of the past five years. Finally, the ef-
fectiveness of Truth in Lending will be analyzed and major prob-
lems will be discussed.
IMPLEMENTING THE ACT
The Federal Reserve Board is charged with implementing
the provisions of Truth in Lending. The Board has two distinct
duties: regulatory responsibility for all creditors and enforcement
responsibility for state-chartered banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System.' 3  The Board is also charged with 1)
granting exemptions from the federal law to states with substan-
tially similar qualifying laws,'" and 2) submitting an annual re-
port to Congress concerning its administrative functions under
the Act.' 5
The Federal Reserve Board's regulatory responsibility in-
10. Extensions of credit are broken into two categories with different disclo-
sure schemes: open end credit and other than open end credit. Open end credit
typically includes bank credit cards and revolving accounts. The Act regulates
these transactions by requiring the creditor to make certain general disclosures
when the account is opened (12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a) (1973)), and to provide addi-
tional information with each monthly statement (12 C.F.R. § 226.7(b) (1973)).
Open end credit is defined at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(r) (1973). That section states:
'Open end credit' means consumer credit extended on an account pur-
suant to a plan under which (1) the creditor may permit the customer
to make purchases or obtain loans, from time to time, directly from the
creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card, check, or other device, as
the plan may provide; (2) the customer has the privilege of paying the
balance in full or in installments; and (3) a finance charge may be
computed by the creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid
balance. The term does not include negotiated advances under an open
end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit.
Credit other than open end credit requires disclosure by the creditor before the
transaction is consummated. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1973).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) the text of which is quoted at note 5
supra.
12. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356
(1973); Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464
F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
955 (N.D. 111. 1972); Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1116 (D.
Alas. 1971).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1607 (1970).
14. Id. 9 1633.
15. Id. § 1613.
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cludes the issuance of implementing regulations which are en-
forced by all agencies. Collectively, these regulations are known
as Regulation Z.16 The Board amends and interprets Regulation
Z as necessary.17  The Board's staff also informally interprets
Regulation Z 'by answering in letter form the vast number of in-
quiries from consumers, business men and attorneys concerning
the effect of Regulation Z on particular transactions. These letters
have been both relied -upon and ignored by the courts. 18 They have
been made available to the public and have been published com-
mercially.19
The year spent drafting Regulation Z and the almost five
years spent administering it have involved constant decisionmak-
ing by the Board in an effort to make the requirements of Truth
in Lending as workable and effective as possible. The exceed-
ingly complex nature of credit extension has made the task a dif-
ficult one. Regulation Z has been adjusted continually in an at-
tempt to minimize the burdens on creditors while providing the
consumer with the optimum amount of understandable credit
information. 20 All of these decisions have been made in the
shadow of the conflict between the need to keep disclosures
simple while at the same time providing as much information as
16. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-13 (1973).
17. Amendments and interpretations in the form of a pamphlet and supple-
ment may be obtained from the Board in Washington, D.C., 20551, or from any
Federal Reserve Bank. The status of a formal Board interpretation has recently
been reviewed in Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr Gunn
99,025 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
When interpreting an administrative regulation whose meaning is in
doubt, we must necessarily look to the construction given the regulation
by the agency responsible for its promulgation. . . . Great deference
is especially due the Federal Reserve Board's construction of its own
Regulation Z because of the important interpretive and enforcement
powers granted this agency by Congress under the Truth in Lending
Act. . . . (footnotes omitted).
18. The court in Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp.
270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) declined to accept an interpretation contained in
a staff letter. The court emphasized that the opinion in the letter was that of
the attorney who wrote it and not of the Board itself. But see the Board's own
view of the weight of a letter from its staff, 4 CCH CoNs. CRFD. GUIDE
30,640. It should be noted that in Ratner the letter was sent after litigation had
begun. Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971) sug-
gests that the court might view a staff letter more favorably if it is received prior
to initiation of the suit.
19. See CCH CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (1971); CLONTZ, TRUTH IN LENDINO
MANUAL (1973).
20. The Board has issued more than fifty formal interpretations of its provi-
sions and has amended Regulation Z numerous times. The 1973 amendments
include provisions which simplify and clarify the advertising restrictions of the
Regulation. For example, the amount of information which must be included
in an open end credit advertisement once a specific "triggering" term is used has
been reduced. See 38 Fed. Reg. 18457 (1973). See also Garwood, A New Look
at Credit Advertising Under Regulation Z, 91 BANKING L.J. 48 (1974).
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possible to the consumer. An attempt has been made to deter-
mine and avoid the point at which disclosures become so compli-
cated that they fail in their objective of informing the public, at
a glance, what the cost of the offered credit will be.21 Unfor-
tunately, given the complexity inherent in many transactions, the
disclosures are often necessarily complicated.
While the Federal Reserve Board has, of course, made hun-
dreds of decisions with regard to the implementation of Truth in
Lending, three are particularly significant. These three are the
more-than-four installment rule,2 the application of the right of
rescission to mechanics' and materialmen's liens2" and the deci-
sion relating to confession of judgments.24  Although there have
been many other difficult interpretations, these three are good il-
lustrations of the type of problem with which the regulatory
agency has grappled in its effort to implement the Act.
MAJOR FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD DECISIONS
The More-Than-Four Installment Rule
The Act requires disclosure "to each person to whom con-
sumer credit is extended and upon whom a finance charge is
or may be imposed."2  Because of the widespread practice of
concealing the credit charges within the purchase price of goods,
the Board provided in Regulation Z, that Truth in Lending applies
to transactions payable in more than four installments even
when no separately identifiable finance charge iA designated.
26
By this rule the Board gave notice to vendors that they could
not evade the Act's requirements by concealing finance charges.
This was done to ensure that the "no charge for credit" sellers
would make important disclosures such as the total purchase
price even when no finance charge or annual percentage rate was
apparent on the face of the transaction.2" The Board's more-
than-four installment rule was based on the economic fact that
such installment contracts typically include some compensation
to the creditor for the cost involved in allowing deferred pay-
ment, even though that cost may not be separately identified as
a finance charge.
The Board's rule was challenged in Mourning v. Family Pub-
21. For a discussion of this process see Garwood, Truth in Lending-A Reg-
ulator's View, 29 Bus. LAw. 193 (1973).
22. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973).
23. Id. §§ 226.2(a), 226.2(z).
24. Id. § 226.202.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973).
27. See id. § 226.8(b)(3).
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lications Service, Inc.28 Mrs. Mourning, a seventy-three year old
widow, had been approached by a representative of Family Pub-
lications Service, a corporation engaged in soliciting magazine
subscriptions door-to-door. Mrs. Mourning purchased a five
year subscription to four magazines, and agreed to make thirty-
one monthly payments of $3.95 each. She signed a contract
which included an acceleration clause providing that any default
on the monthly payment made the entire balance due and a clause
stating that the subscription could not be cancelled. The con-
tract did not make any mention of the total price of $122.45
and, more significantly, made no mention of any finance charges.
The district court held that the transaction was an extention of
credit subject to the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z
since payments were to be in more than four installments.29 The
court of appeals, however, reversed the decision holding that the
Board had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing a regulation
making Truth in Lending disclosure requirements applicable to
such transactions.8 0
The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, re-jected the defendant's contention that the "Four Installment
Rule" exceeded the scope of the Board's powers. The defend-
ant urged that the Act was to be interpreted narrowly and
its application limited to transactions in which a finance charge is
actually imposed. The Court, however, reiterated that Congress had
intended that the Board be given broad rulemaking powers to
insure that all those extending consumer credit would be in-
cluded within the Act, even if the form of the credit extension
were unusual.". Therefore, the Court found the "Four Install-
ment Rule" to be a valid exercise of the Board's powers. 2
28. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
29. See 449 F.2d 235, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1971).
30. 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. The Truth in Lending Act gives the Board power to prescribe regulations
to carry out the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). In deciding
whether a Board regulation is reasonably related to the purposes of the Act a
court will apparently defer to the Board finding. See, e.g., Charnita, Inc. v.
FTC, 479 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1973) (the court upheld the validity of the Board's
regulation concerning a "security interest" in the consumer's residence); N.C.
Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973) (the court up-
held the Board's regulation which defined "security interest" to include non-con-
sensual liens).
32. Although agreeing with the majority that Regulation Z was valid, Justices
Douglas, Stewart and Rehnquist, in partial dissent, would have remanded the case
to the district court. They raised the possibility that the transaction involved
in Mourning was not a true credit transaction because the publishing service may
have made no advances for Mrs. Mourning for which she had not already paid.
Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, noted that there may have been an exten-
sion of credit but it was by Mrs. Mourning and not by the defendant. Justice
Powell arrived at this conclusion because the facts showed that Mrs. Mourning
[Vol. 14
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The Right of Recission
A second major decision of the Federal Reserve Board re-
quired that a consumer's three-day right to rescind a contract,
when a security interest is taken in his home, 33 should apply when
non-consensual liens are acquired in any real property which is
the consumer's principal residence. 34  The right to rescind the
transaction continues for three days. This period begins to run
from the later of two dates: 1) from the date the contract is con-
summated, or 2) from the date the disclosure of the rescission
right and other disclosures required by Truth in Lending are
made.33 The rationale for allowing a right to rescind in the case
of simple lien rights as well as when a security interest such as a
mortgage arises, is that in either case the consumer could lose
his home thrugh foreclosure proceedings. The Board, therefore,
provided in Regulation Z that the right of rescission be ex-
tended to credit transactions which involve mechanic's or ma-
terialmen's liens on the consumer's home.
Like the more-than-four installment rule, this Board decision
paid every month for two months worth of magazines. Thus, until she had re-
ceived the last magazine she would have paid for more than she received. Never-
theless, the majority of the Court was clear in its support of congressional intent
to protect consumers by the mechanism of disclosure. Apparently, the Court felt
that to have disallowed the more-than-four installment rule would have made it
too easy for creditors to circumvent Truth in Lending.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
34. Under 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1973), a three-day rescission right is appli-
cable when a security interest is taken in the consumer's principal residence
(other than in the case of a first purchase money mortgage). Subsection (2)
of 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1973) defines "security interest" and "security" as:
[A]ny interest in property which secures payment or performance of
an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited to, security inter-
ests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages,
deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not
recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens,
vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller
in a contract for the sale of real property arising by operation of law,
and any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance
of an obligation.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1973) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any credit
transaction in which a security interest is or will be retained or ac-
quired in any real property which is used or is expected to be used as
the principal residence of the customer, the customer shall have the
right to rescind that transaction until midnight of the third business day
following the date of consummation of that transaction or the date of
delivery of the disclosures required under this section and all other ma-
terial disclosures required under this Part, whichever is later, by notify-
ing the creditor by mail, telegram, or other writing of his intention to
do so.
Conceivably, if no disclosure is made by the creditor, the consumer's right to
rescind the contract could continue indefinitely. The Board has suggested that
Congress amend the Act to provide a limitation on the time the right of rescis-
sion may run. FED. REsERvE BoARD, TRuTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CON-
Gaess 16 (1973).
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was challenged in the courts. After conflicting holdings by fed-
eral district courts, two United States courts of appeals upheld
the validity of the Board's decision. 6
The first of these cases-Gardner & North Roofing & Sid-
ing Corp. v. Board of Governors17 -was an action for a declar-
atory judgment challenging the Board's decision in extending the
consumer's right of rescission. The argument that Congress did
not intend the term "security interest" to include liens created by
law was rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 8
Instead the court insisted that the Act must be given a broad in-
terpretation in order to carry out its purpose of protecting the
consumer. The court noted that without disclosure of all conse-
quences of a home improvement contract, the home-owner would
be exposed to "hidden and perhaps fatal traps."3 9
In a case almost identical to Gardner & North, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the validity of a recission
regulation in N. C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors.40 In
language similar to that found in Gardner & North the court
ruled that as a remedial act, the Truth in Lending provisions and
the rules issued pursuant to the Act must be given broad inter-
pretation in order to carry out the intent of Congress. Seeing the
regulation as a clarification of the Act, rather than as an adminis-
trative extension, the court rejected the Freed Company's chal-
lenge.
Confession of Judgments
Another significant Federal Reserve Board decision defined a
"security interest" which will give rise to the consumer's right of
rescission to include a confession of judgment clause." In sev-
36. N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973);
Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838(D.C. Cir. 1972).
37. 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Gardner and North, a New York con-
struction company specializing in remodeling and repairing homes, allowed cus-
tomers to use a deferred payment plan in which case the customer signed a
promissory note. Under the laws of New York, home improvement contractors
are given a lien on the customer's home when work is performed. Once the
lien exists, Truth in Lending comes into play. The effect of the challenged
Board regulation was to require that the customer be notified of his rescission
rights whenever a lien will arise against his home.
38. The term "security interest" is not defined in section 1635(a) of the Act.
Because the section speaks only of a security interest which is "retained or ac-
quired," the appellants asserted this language does not include a lien that may
arse in favor of a third party not privy to the original contract. 464 F.2d at
841.
39. Id. at 842.
40. 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 226.202 (1973).
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eral states it had been common for a creditor to cause the consu-
mer to execute a "confession of judgment clause" permitting the
creditor to obtain a lien on the consumer's property simply by re-
cordation entry of the confessed judgment.42 Under this proce-
dure, the consumer was given no opportunity to enter a de-
fense against such action prior to entry of the judgment. The
Board reasoned that since confession of judgment clauses have
the effect of depriving the consumer of the right to be notified
of a pending action and to enter a defense before judgment is en-
tered or recorded against him, such clauses are security interests
for the purposes of Truth in Lending. 3 In effect, when the con-
sumer signs a confession of judgment instrument, it is just as if he
had signed a second mortgage. This Board decision was chal-
lenged and upheld in Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co.4" The
district court ruled that not only did a confession of judgment
provision constitute a security interest under Regulation Z, but
the explicit regulation that requires disclosure of the finance
charge and annual percentage rate on the face of the docu-
ment45 must be followed.46 The Douglas decision is in accord
with the basic philosophy of Truth in Lending--consumer protec-
tion through disclosure and notice.
EFFECTIVENESS OF TRUTH IN LENDING LEGISLATION
Consumer Awareness
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that it is extremely
difficult to truly measure the effectiveness of Truth in Lending
legislation. However, there are some concrete indications of
how it is working. The National Commission on Consumer Fi-
nance47 authorized two studies to determine consumer awareness
of annual percentage rates.48  One study was an analysis of two
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (1965); PA. RULES CIV. PRO.
§§ 2950-76 (1967).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 226.202 (1973).
44. 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d
453 (9th Cir. 1972).
45. 12 C.F.R. § 226.801 (1973).
46. 334 F. Supp. at 1174-75.
47. This Commission was established by Title IV of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (Supp. 1973) (enacted on May 29, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 401-07, 82 Stat. 164, as amended, June 30, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-321, §§ 401-07, 86 Stat. 382). A discussion of the Commission's spe-
cific recommendations for amendments to the Truth in Lending Act appears in
the Truth in Lending Annual Report to Congress for the Year 1973 by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 21 (Jan.
16, 1974).




surveys conducted for the Federal Reserve Board in 1969 and
1970;1" the other study involved 641 personal interviews in Cali-
fornia.50
Both studies indicate that there are two distinct markets for
credit-the "general market" and the "high risk market."5' 1 The
general market includes consumers with higher educational lev-
els and family incomes above $8,000. General market consumers
are likely to be white, own homes in non-poverty areas, and rely
relatively more on cash loans than do consumers in the high risk
market who depend on vendor credit. The high risk market"
is generally characterized by consumers with a high school educa-
tion or less and with a family income below $8,000. Such con-
sumers more typically rent residences in poverty areas, are more
likely to be black than white, and rely heavily on vendor credit.
The studies concluded that approximately forty to fifty per
cent of the consumers within the general market were aware of
the annual percentage rate (APR) in credit transactions. They
could recall and quote an APR on loans and credit purchases
in the range of rates commonly charged. In terms of fostering
rival rate competition among creditors, the surveys concluded that
this level of awareness was probably adequate to stimulate com-
petition. All consumers need not be aware of the APR to bring
about effective price competition since a significant marginal
group of consumers who are aware and do shop for credit terms
is sufficient to "police" the market."
The National Commission on Consumer Finance concluded
that fifteen months after the effective date of Truth in Lending,
APR awareness had not reached many consumers in the high risk
market and price competition was less effective in that market. 4
However, the Commission points out that there are natural limita-
tions to the effectiveness of Truth in Lending in the high risk
market. Credit in that market is "rationed" in the sense that the
consumers cannot obtain as much credit as they might wish.
Also, such consumers are more likely to care about the required
down-payment and the size of monthly payments than about the
actual cost of credit. According to the Commission:
TIL improves the market by requiring disclosure of all pertin-
49. This analysis, the Shay-Schober Study, is based on two large nationwide
telephone and personal interview surveys conducted for the Board. The first sur-
vey was made in 1969 immediately before the effective date of Truth in Lending,
and the second occurred fifteen months later. Id. at 175-76.
50. The Brandt-Day study was conducted in October, 1970. Id.
51. Id. at 176.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 177.
[Vol. 14
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ent credit terms, but it cannot be expected that quotation
of the APR will cause rationed consumers to shift from shop-
ping for low downpayments and low monthly payments to
comparative shopping for price. Until these consumers be-
come more affluent, rate disclosure will not add significantly
to their economic well-being. 55
One interesting conclusion drawn by the Commission was that
there is a plateau of awareness of annual percentage rates and
Truth in Lending legislation which is significantly below one hun-
dred per cent. The awareness level is not likely to go higher
because along with the group of consumers who are "learners"
there are "forgetters." 56 Unless there are changes in whatever var-
iables affect the rate of forgetting,5 7 awareness will peak at
about sixty-seven percent, an acceptable level.5" Compared to
this realistic percent of expected awareness, the fifty percent APR
awareness already shown to exist in the general market is heart-
ening. 59
Furthermore, compared to a goal of sixty-seven per-
cent, the Federal Reserve Board's two surveys are encouraging
even though the absolute figures were rather low. For exam-
ple, one survey indicated that, although only twelve percent of
consumers with personal loans in 1969 reported that their annual
percentage rate was as high as ten percent, more than twenty-
five percent of the borrowers reported such rates in the 1970 sur-
vey.6 An annual percentage rate of ten percent or more was
reported in 1969 by approximately seventeen percent of the
consumers who had bought appliances or furniture on credit,
as compared with approximately forty percent of the consumers in
1970.61 The rise in the number of knowledgeable consumers is
similar for annual percentage rate awareness on other types of
credit transactions as well. For all credit transactions, unrealisti-
cally low rates were reported less frequently in the 1970 sur-
vey.6 2
Beyond this data there are other indicia of the effectiveness
of Truth in Lending. There has been an increase in competitive
55. Id. at 179.
56. Id. at 180.
57. Variables might be experiences with credit or concern over the cost of
credit. Id. at 180.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. FED. RESERVE BOARD, TUTH-N-LENDNG ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 9
(1970).
61. Id. at 9-10.
62. Id. at 10. It should be noted, however, that the upward trend in rates
reported on first mortgage financing appeared to be primarily a reflection of the




"annual percentage rate" advertising among banks in some mar-
kets, and "bait" credit advertising appears to be on the wane.6
Finally, the fact that the typical charge on revolving credit ac-
counts is eighteen percent now seems to be a well known middle-
class household fact.
Truth in Lending and the Low Income Consumer
There is some question about the effectiveness of the Act
for the low income consumer, but unfortunately it may not be
realistic to expect Truth in Lending alone to provide a solution to
the credit problems of the poor. The poor are under other disa-
bilities which profoundly affect the way in which family assets
are distributed. 64 Low income consumers often do not have the
means to conduct comparative shopping either because the in-
formation is unavailable or because credit is available only
through certain outlets. The low income consumer who is
also non-English speaking is even more limited in finding sources
of credit. Naturally, he will tend to deal with merchants with
whom he can communicate. As yet, Truth in Lending has no re-
quirement that disclosures be made in any language but English. 5
The effectiveness of Truth in Lending presupposes a consumer who
is able to shop around for the best buys in goods and services.
Low income consumers may be forced by necessity to consider
only monthly payments in making purchases and therefore may
be unable to seek the best credit terms available. 66
Problems such as these have deep roots and their correction
was neither contemplated nor predicted by the proponents of
63. The term "bait" credit advertising refers to the situation in which the
consumer is lured into credit transactions by advertised terms or products which
are not actually offered by the vendor. For example, although a low downpay-
ment or monthly payment is advertised the consumer is told that these terms
are available only on the more expensive item. See 15 U.S.C. § 1663 (1970);
12 C.F.R. § 226.10(a) (1973).
64. See Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745
(1967) [hereinafter Consumer Comment]. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE
POOR PAY MORE (1967); Note, Instalment Sales: Plight of the Low Income
Buyer, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1 (1966).
65. A cogent argument can be made that for disclosure to be meaningful,
as required by section 1601 of the Act, the language of disclosure must be under-
stood by the consumer. However, the need to bring meaningful disclosure to
the non-English speaking people in the nation must be weighed against the prob-
lems that requiring foreign language disclosure would entail. No Board recom-
mendation has been made in this regard. But see Statement by J.L. Robertson,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, before the Subcommittee on Consumer Af-
fairs, House Banking and Currency Committee, March 22, 1972.
66. Consumer Comment, supra note 64, at 750, citing Hearings on H.R.
7179 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1966); Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1960).
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Truth in Lending. For the low income consumer Truth in Lend-
ing is but a small step toward more intelligent spending but, nev-
ertheless, many of the benefits resulting from the Act serve to
give a basis for protection of the poor just as they do other strata
of society.
Additional Positive Aspects of Truth in Lending
There are several side effects related to consumer credit
which probably have their origin in Truth in Lending disclosure
requirements. The present concern over the use of the "previ-
ous balance method" in computing finance charges on open end
credit accounts may have been stimulated in part by the fact
that Truth in Lending requires a creditor to disclose specifically if
he utilizes this method.67  The previous balance method of com-
putation gives no credit for partial payments made during the bill-
ing cycle.68  Of even greater significance as a side effect is the
recent challenge to the validity of confession of judgment
clauses.69 It was probably Truth in Lending that highlighted these
clauses through disclosure and rescission provisions.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(2) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a)(2) (1969). An
attempt to amend Title I of the Fair Credit Billing Act (S. 2101) to prohibit
the previous balance method was defeated fifty-six to thirty-three when the Sen-
ate passed the bill, but the issue will probably be considered by the House of
Representatives when it considers the legislation. 119 CONG. Rac. 14411 (daily
ed. July 23, 1973). The issue has not yet been considered by the House of Rep-
resentatives.
The latest version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code permits use of the
previous balance method. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.202(2) (b)
(Working Redraft No. 5, 1973). This method is apparently also allowed under
the Unruh Act. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1810.2(d) (West 1973); Siebert v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 99,164,
at 89,057 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 1972), which holds that the "previous bal-
ance" method of computing finance charges is permissible under Civil Code sec-
tion 1810.2.
68. For example, given an APR of eighteen percent (one and one-half per-
cent per month), if at the end of the first monthly billing cycle the consumer
owes $100 and promptly pays $75, the amount of interest for which the con-
sumer is billed is calculated on the basis of the $100 balance rather than on
the $25 which actually remains unpaid. In the next billing cycle the previous
balance will be $26.50 ($25 + $1.50) and interest will usually be computed on
that amount as well as on any other amount charged during the first billing cy-
cle.
69. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) in which the plaintiffs
challenged Pennsylvania statutes permitting confession of judgment on due proc-
ess grounds. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge to the statutes on their face,
but emphasized that this in no way constituted approval of the statutes as ap-
plied. Other cases evidencing the hostility of courts to statutes allowing collec-
tion before litigation include Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13,
96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
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The results, then, on the whole are encouraging. Although
confusion has not been completely eradicated, progress has been
made in improving the public's understanding of the cost of
credit.
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS
Many problems have arisen in implementing Truth in Lend-
ing legislation. Most Federal Reserve Board amendments of
Regulation Z and most interpretations have grown out of some
difficulty in administering the Act. Problems have stemmed
from two principal sources. The first is the incredible complex-
ity and variety of methods used in extending credit. To a large
extent, this is a result of the patchwork quilt of state laws which
have determined the course of the consumer credit industry for
so many years. The problem may diminish as more states adopt
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code which limits the forms in which
credit may be extended. 0 But until now credit has been extended
in as many different ways as creative and ingenious minds can de-
vise. Credit is an extremely complicated area of human en-
deavor, and, as with all complicated things, it breeds problems.
The second source of problems is the fact that the credit
granting process has not remained static. Credit is being granted
today in ways that are vastly different than in 1968 when the
Truth in Lending Act was enacted. 71 As the methods of granting
credit change, so Regulation Z must change. Although ,the flu-
idity of the problems renders definitions and solutions diffi-
cult, five major areas of concern, some still unresolved, are exam-
ined below.
Advertising
One requirement of the Act is that whenever a creditor ad-
vertises a single credit term, he must give additional, applicable
70. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.201-10, 2.301-13 (dealing
with maximum charges, disclosure and advertising in credit sales) and §§ 3.201-
10, 3.301-12 (dealing with maximum charges, disclosure and advertising for
loans). At present the Code has been adopted in Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
71. For an illustration of problems arising in one method of credit extension
see FRB letter No. 673, 4 CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 30,949 (1973) which dis-
cusses matching the open end credit disclosure pattern to the purchase of items
such as automobiles, boats or property improvements. When a consumer fi-
nances a car, for example, he may receive credit from a bank with the express
understanding that he may obtain further credit advances, subject to bank ap-
proval, for future purchases. Thus the consumer may continue to borrow on his
line of credit for tires, repairs, etc. In this way, a line of credit may be de-
veloped which is similar to an open end credit account which allows the con-
sumer to make continuous purchases, resulting in a running outstanding balance.
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credit terms.72 In other words, advertising of a specific credit
term triggers a requirement of further disclosure. While this pro-
vision has worked well in the area of closed end credit (mort-
gages, notes, installment contracts), difficulties have arisen with
similar disclosure requirements for open end credit (bank credit
card plans, charge accounts and the like). Simply stated, so much
information was required once a term triggering compliance with
Regulation Z was used, that open end creditors, for the most
part, were discouraged from attempting to advertise other than
in very general terms which would not mandate additional dis-
closures.73  Thus, the very purpose of Truth in Lending, mean-
ingful disclosure to the public, was discouraged by a regulation
meant to further that purpose. In recognition of this situation,
on July 11, 1973, some disclosure requirements were amended
to trim back the information that must be given when a
specific credit term is used in advertising open end credit.74  For
example, a statement which triggers the requirement for addition-
al disclosures no longer requires the minimum periodic payment
to be shown. Technical changes in the advertising provisions
were given effect. These changes were promulgated in an effort
to make the provisions more workable and to encourage specific
advertising of credit terms.75  It is through advertising that con-
sumers can most easily shop for the most advantageous credit ar-
rangement. Hopefully, these changes will stimulate more adver-
tising of specific terms.76
Disclosure of the Annual Percentage Rate
Another problem has been creditor resistance to the disclo-
sure of annual percentage rates. Notwithstanding the enactment
of Truth in Lending, some extenders of credit continued quoting
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1663, 1664(d) (1970).
73. 12 C.F.R. § 226.10(c) (1973).
74. 38 Fed. Reg. 18457-58 (1973), amending 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2, 226.10
(1973). In section 226.2(u), the words "under an open end credit plan" have
been deleted. Subsections (5) and (6) of section 226.10(c) have been deleted
and section 226.10(d) has been substantially reworded. Id.
75. See a description of the changes accompanying the regulations in 38 Fed.
Reg. 18457 (1973). Generally the changes simplify and clarify the advertising
restrictions of the regulation by limiting the amount of information required to
be disclosed in an advertisement.
76. With regard to private rights of action for advertising violations, district
courts have disagreed. Compare Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d
78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) with Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In Jordan it was held that sec-
tion 130 of the Act did not create a private right of action for violations of
the advertising provisions. The Garza court assumed, without deciding, that it
had jurisdiction to enjoin fraudulent credit advertising, including violations of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
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the add-on 77 or discount rate 7 rather than the annual percent-
age rate, in response to oral inquiries from consumers about the
cost of credit."9 Such quotations may have given the consumer
the impression that the cost of credit was substantially under the
true cost. By an interpretation of Regulation Z, also issued on
July 11, 1973, the Board specified that the annual percentage
rate, and not the add-on or discount rate, is to be used in re-
sponse to such inquiries.80  This interpretation should remedy the
problem.
Timing of Disclosures
While the advertising of credit represents a problem which
hopefully has been solved, the timing of real estate disclosures
presents a problem not yet satisfactorily answered. The Act re-
quires disclosures to be made "before the credit is extended.""'
In order to give some precision to this requirement, Regulation
Z requires disclosure before the credit transaction is "consum-
mated.""2  Consummation is defined as the point when a con-
tractual relationship has arisen between the parties under state
law. 8 While this may often occur before actual closing of a
real estate loan, at times consummation does not occur until set-
tlement of the loan. If disclosures are not delivered until closing
it is highly questionable whether they can properly serve the
"credit shopping" function anticipated by Congress. 4
In an attempt to solve this problem, the Federal Reserve
77. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONS. FINANCE REP., CONS. CRED. IN THE U.S. 169
(1972). The report notes that prior to Truth in Lending:
Retailers, finance companies and some banks often quoted the rate as
a dollar add-on-an expression of the dollar amount of the finance
charge per annum in relation to the initial unpaid balance. For in-
stance, the finance charge on a new car loan might have been stated
as $7 per $100 per year, indicating that on a 3-year loan of $2,000
the dollar amount of the finance charge was $420 ($140 x 3 years).
The APR on such a contract is 12.83 percent.
Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Prior to Truth in Lending,
[c]ommercial and industrial banks often quoted rates on a discount
basis-a statement of dollars per $100 of initial unpaid balance on the
assumption that the finance charge was deducted from the face amount
of the note at the time credit was extended. A charge of $7 per $100
of initial unpaid balance discounted for 3 years is equivalent to an APR
of 16.01 percent.
Id. (emphasis in original).79. A series of surveys by the Ralph Nader associated "Public Interest Re-
search Groups" highlighted the problem. See FED. REsERVE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-
LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 11 (1973).
80. 38 Fed. Reg. 18458 (1973).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(b), 1639(b) (1970).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1973).
83. Id. § 226.2(cc).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) the text of which is quoted at note 5 supra.
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Board published a proposed rule requiring disclosures at least
ten days prior to closing.85 In response, the Board received an
avalanche of adverse comment, almost exclusively from mortgage
lenders in small communities. The thrust of these comments was
that such loans are routinely processed in less than ten days in
small communities, and a fixed ten day rule would be a severe
burden on both sellers and buyers of homes.
At approximately the same time as publication of the pro-
posed rule, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court decision in Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp.,8 6
which had held that the Act required disclosure prior to closing.
The appellate court in Bissette determined that at the time the
Bissettes entered into a credit relationship with Colonial Mortgage
Corporation, the law required disclosure at any time prior to
the existence of a contractual relationship between borrower and
lender.8 7  Because the district court made no finding as to
when the contract arose, the case was remanded. 8s The effect of
the decision was to recognize that the time when the agreement
becomes a contract is the key time irrespective of when closing
might occur. The appellate court rejected the lower court's rea-
soning that the Truth in Lending Act disclosure prior to closing in
a home purchase and mortgage transaction was necessary for
credit shoppers. Borrowers, it commented, could demand a prior
commitment of financing terms."' Nevertheless, the court agreed
that disclosure well before final formalities would be preferable
for the consumer and made it clear that the Bissette holding
would in no way invalidate the proposed Federal Reserve Board
amendment requiring disclosure not less than ten business days
before the customer executes evidence of debt. 90
Congress also has expressed interest in the problem of time
of disclosure. Recently a bill requiring pre-settlement disclosure
passed the Senate." The 'bill as passed requires delivery of a full
statement of closing costs to be incurred by the borrower prior
to the time any down payment is made or, if the transaction con-
cerns real property, at the time thd creditor makes a commit-
ment with respect to the transaction. In light of these develop-
ments, the Board has deferred further action on the problem until
85. 37 Fed. Reg. 15522 (1972).
86. 477 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Id. at 1246.
88. Id. at 1248.
89. Id. at 1247.
90. Id.
91. S. Res. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reported in 119 CONG. REC.
14428 (daily ed. July 23, 1973), amending 15 U.S.C. 1631 (1970) with the addi-
tion of section 209.
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the Congress acts.9 2
Consumer Leasing
While the Act and Regulation Z have a provision which
defines those instances in which a lease should be deemed a
credit sale so as to require Truth in Lending disclosures,93 the
area of consumer leasing is rapidly expanding in a fashion which
may make this provision inadequate. Over two million automo-
biles were leased in 1971, and all indications are that the percent-
age of leased consumer goods will accelerate rapidly during the
1970's. 4 Although the problems of leasing are in their infancy,
it can be anticipated that they will become more acute as leases
become a common substitute for the traditional installment sales
contract., The Federal Reserve Board has recommended to
Congress that it review the area of consumer leases and has sug-
gested as a starting point that it examine the provisions of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.95
Recognizing the increasing popularity of the lease as an al-
ternative to sale, the drafters of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code included several sections which are applicable to leases.
The Code defines a "consumer lease" as one in which a lessor, regu-
larly engaged in the business of leasing, makes a lease of goods
to a person other than for business use for a term exceeding four
months and for an amount not exceeding $25,000.90 Other ap-
plicable code sections provide: 1) if the transaction is a lease
there must be full disclosure of all charges imposed as well as
information concerning the amounts, number and schedule of
periodic payments; 97  2) lessors must also set forth the method
92. FEr. REsEnv BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 8(1973).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(n) (1973).
94. American Banker, Sept. 19, 1973, at 14. See Comment, Automobile
Leasing: Is the Moscone Act Really Protecting the Consumer?, 14 SANTA CLARA
LAw. - (1974).
95. FED. RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 14
(1973); see UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.105(4), 2.106, 2.311, 2.313,
2.406, 2.407, 5.101 et seq., 6.101 et seq.
In connection with leasing by bank holding companies of personal property,
the Board has recommended legislation to require "suitable disclosures" in con-
nection with consumer leases. These disclosures would be similar to those re-
quired under the Act for credit costs and would provide adequate leasing cost
disclosures. FRB Press Release 3 (March 20, 1974).
96. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.106. The four month require-
ment serves to exempt the short term rental or hire agreement often used for
automobiles, sick room equipment, etc. See also id. § 1.301(14) (Working Re-
draft No. 5, 1973).
97. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.311. See also id. § 3.202 (Work-
ing Redraft No. 5, 1973).
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by which a lessee can terminate the lease and any liabilities
which might be incurred by the lessee at the end of the term;98
3) lessors are prohibited from engaging in false or misleading
advertising concerning the terms of the lease;9 9 4) the remedies
and penalties applicable to enforce rights arising from consumer
credit sales apply equally to consumer leases. 100
Agricultural Credit
The inclusion of agricultural credit under the coverage of
Truth in Lending has stirred a great deal of controversy, and has
caused numerous problems." The very nature of many agri-
cultural transactions, involving advances and payments for which
both time and amount are unknown when the transaction is con-
summated, makes meaningful disclosure difficult. Furthermore,
it has often been argued that since agriculture is a business, it
should be exempt from the Act's coverage, just as other business
credit is exempt. 1'0 2  In spite of several amendments to Regulation
Z designed to make disclosure easier for agricultural creditors
and more meaningful to farmers, 10 3 these problems may not have
been completely solved.
The Federal Reserve Board has stated that a strong case can
be made for neither complete coverage nor complete exemption
of agricultural credit under Truth in Lending. It has recom-
mended that credit primarily for agricultural purposes in excess
of $25,000 be exempted from the Act, whether or not secured
by real property,10 4 and this exemption has won Senate approval.0 5
It is reasonable to remove large extensions of credit from cover-
age since they are generally extended to sophisticated borrowers
who are less in need of disclosures than smaller borrowers who
would still be covered. Such an amendment would benefit credi-
98. Id.
99. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.313. The prohibitions under this
section apply to advertising by the lessor in any state in which the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code has been enacted even though the lease was not made in that
state. See also id. § 3.209 (Working Redraft No. 5, 1973).
100. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.102 et seq. These sections re-
strict deficiency judgments and garnishment, extend rescission rights, provide
remedies for unconscionability and enumerate civil and criminal penalties for vio-
lations. But see id. § 5.103 (Working Redraft No. 5, 1973) (restrictions on defi-
ciency judgments do not appear to apply to leases); § 5.203 (Working Redraft
No. 5, 1973) (civil liability for violation of advertising disclosure provisions may
not apply to leases).
101. FED. RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 21
(1973).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970).
103. See C.F.R. § 226.8(p) (1973).
104. Id. Appendix D at 4.
105. S. Res. 2101, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (reported in 119 CONG. REC.
14428 (daily ed. July 23, 1973)), amending 15 U.S.C. 1603 (1970).
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tors by eliminating the need for disclosures in some large and
complex credit situations.
CONCLUSION
The five years that have passed since the enactment of the
Truth in Lending Act have witnessed a tremendous growth in the
importance of consumer credit in the American economy. With
this growth have come problems and for many of these prob-
lems, Truth in Lending has provided a solution through action by
the Federal Reserve Board which has implemented and interpreted
the Act in the broad manner intended by Congress.
The Act and Regulation Z have been judicially tested and
usually upheld by the courts which have repeatedly emphasized
the remedial nature of the legislation and the necessity for liberal
interpretation. The cases involving the more-than-four install-
ment rule, the right of rescission, and the confession of judgment
clauses illustrate the deference of the judiciary to legislative in-
tent in this area.
With respect to creditor compliance with the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, the federal agencies with general supervisory authority
over their creditor groups, such as the Federal Reserve Board, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration, have reported that the level
of compliance is high.10 6  For the most part, compliance is deter-
mined by these agencies during the regular periodic examina-
tions which occur at least once each year. This is an on-going
effort by a staff of examiners who have complete access to credit
institutions' records. 10 7
Based upon the reports of all enforcement agencies, includ-
ing state agencies, 0 s the Federal Reserve Board has concluded
that substantial compliance with Truth in Lending is being
achieved.' 0 9 One stimulus to this compliance has been the ef-
forts of trade associations throughout the years to educate their
106. FED. RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 11
(1973).
107. This type of enforcement procedure differs, of course, from the enforce-
ment activity of the Federal Trade Commission which, to an important degree,
is activated by individual complaints.
108. States reporting statistical evidence of the degree of compliance were as
follows: Connecticut-81 percent of the creditors examined were in compliance;
Maine-62 percent of creditors under its jurisdiction examined in 1971 were in
complete compliance, 14 percent were in substantial compliance, 19 percent were
in partial compliance and 5 percent were not in compliance. FED. RESERVE
BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REa'. TO CONGRESS 15 (1971).
109. FED. RESERVE BOARD, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 11
(1973).
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members and keep them informed. Probably of equal impor-
tance is the spectre of a class action suit which haunts major
creditors as they decide how much attention they will give to
compliance with Truth in Lending. 110 Finally, the Act provides
for civil penalties with minimum individual damages, in addition
to attorneys' fees and costs for noncompliance with the disclosure
requirements."'
It is widely accepted that Truth in Lending has worked far
better than its most vocal proponents predicted, and that it has
brought benefits to the American public as a whole. It may not
have helped low income consumers as much as some had
hoped, but those who held such expectations probably failed to
consider and weigh the impact of more fundamental problems
than mere disclosure of credit terms. There have been difficu[-
ties in implementing credit disclosure requirements, but the prob-
lems are not insoluble. Compliance has been high, and the
public is better informed and more knowledgeable about credit
today than at any previous time. Improved consumer awareness
of credit costs is the product of Truth in Lending and to that ex-
tent it has fulfilled its function.
110. See id. at 13 for a discussion of class actions. The trend of the cases
is away from allowing class actions for the enforcement of Truth in Lending.
.
E.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Buford
v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Garza v. Chicago
Health Clubs, 347 F. Supp. 955 (1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Ratner, Judge Frankel found "cogent
and persuasive" defendant's argument that the "proposed recovery of $100 each
for some 130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit
to defendant . . ." 54 F.R.D. at 416.
The Federal Reserve Board recognizes that in some cases liability may be
disproportionate to any injury sustained by the consumer but it also believes that
potential class liability is an important encouragement to voluntary compliance
with Truth in Lending. In the Board's view, the best way to meet this problem
is to set an upper limit on the aggregate amount of possible class action recovery
(the greater of $50,000 or one percent of net worth is suggested by the Board).
Fan. RsERvE BOARD, TRUrH-N-LENDING ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 14 (1973).
Another problem which may seriously curtail class action suits is expansion
of notice requirements. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), argued, 42 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Mar.
5, 1974).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970) provides in part that any creditor who
fails to make the required disclosures in a consumer credit transaction is liable
to the consumer in an amount equal to the sum of twice the finance charge in
the transaction except that the liability shall not be less than $100. It should
be noted that since a creditor is broadly defined in section 1602(f) as one who
regularly extends or arranges for the extension of credit, the civil liabilities of
section 1640(a)(1) may be found against an assignee. See Philbeck v. Timmers
Chevrolet, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2061 (U.S.D.C. N. Ga. June 28, 1973) (assignee
General Motors Acceptance Corp. held liable as a creditor); Garza v. Chicago
Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. II. 1972) (assignee finance company
held liable as a creditor).
